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Students from Idaho talk about hydrology and the practices that have lowered the level of Laja Lake in the Laguna deI Laja National
Park in Chile. The lake level has gone down almost 200 feet, and the volume has declined 80%, due to diversions for an out of basin
hydroelectric facility.
Traveling to Chile to Learn About Idaho's Water Resource Issues
Jerrold A. Long
F or the first two weeks ofJanuary, students and fac-
ulty from the University of
Idaho's Water Resources
program visited Concep-
ci6n, Chile to study water resource
issues in the Biobjo River Basin. As
part of a National Science Founda-
tion funded Integrated Graduate
Education and Research Traineeship
(IGERT) program,1 this visit sought
to expose the Idaho students to wa-
ter resource issues in a different legal,
cultural, and physical environment.
While the students (and their fac-
ulty advisors) succeeded in learning
a significant amount of information
in a short period of time - with in-
valuable help from Chilean student
and faculty colleagues - the most
significant lessons learned in Chile
were not about the Biobjo or Chil-
ean law or culture. Rather, the most
significant, and hopefully longest-
lasting, lessons were about the water
resource issues we face at home in
Idaho.
One of our challenges was to
avoid viewing Chile only through
the lens of our own experiences.
When comparing our legal institu-
tions - in this case, water resource
institutions - to those of develop-
ing nations, it is simplest to assume
that our successes are the result of
wise choices, careful and strategic
institutional design, a free-market
economy, or legal stability. Our first
response to a problem is often, "well,
this is what we do...4' with the im-
plicit assumption that our approach
should work in the new context as
well. And to some extent, it was an
appreciation of a U.S.-style market
economy that led Chile's "Chicago
We should be cautious when
we assess water resource
conflicts in new geographic,
ecological, hydrological, legal,
and cultural settings.
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Boys"2 to develop a water code that
relies almost entirely on privatiza-
tion and freely tradable water rights,
with little to no government regula-
tion over how, where, when, why, or
even if water is used.3
But what appear to be benefits of
our system, relative to Chile - i.e.,
situations in which we seem to avoid
conflict - might rather be byprod-
ucts of our own mistakes, or the luck
of historical, geographic, or ecologi-
cal context. Thus we should be cau-
tious when we assess water resource
conflicts in new geographic, ecologi-
cal, hydrological, legal, and cultural
settings. It may be, and perhaps is
likely, that what has worked for us
will not work in different context.
Perhaps less obvious, but more im-
portant, is that climate change will
ultimately render a new Columbia
River Basin that is different eco-
logically, hydrologically, culturally,
and perhaps legally from what we
know today - our own home will
transition to that different context
for which our current institutions
might not work.4 We therefore must
be extremely cautious as we think
about how what we do today might
or might not work tomorrow.
What can WE learn when
nothing is the same?
Given the perhaps obvious point
that Chile is a different place, what
does the Bioblo have to say about
water resources in the Pacific North-
west and Idaho? From a cultural and
economic perspective, the Bioblo
River is Chile's most important river
system, and thus plays a cultural and
economic role similar to the Co-
lumbia River. The Bioblo is Chile's
second largest and most developed
river, flowing through the country's
second largest metropolitan area. It
Climate change will ultimately render a new Columbia River Basin
that is different ecologically, hydrologically, culturally,
and perhaps legally from what we know today.
produces almost 5001 of Chile's hy-
droelectricity, and nearly 2000 of its
total electricity.5
Beyond that very general com-
parison, finding a U.S. analogue for
the Bioblo is difficult but useful, be-
cause the Bioblo teaches more with
its differences than with any appar-
ent similarities. Chile is famously
narrow, averaging approximately
110 miles in width from the peaks
of the Andes to the Pacific Ocean,
while running over 2,600 miles
north to south - California, in
comparison, is over twice as wide at
250 miles, but only 770 miles long
north to south. As a result, Chilean
rivers are short and steep, dropping
quickly from the mountains to the
central valley and ocean. Of rivers
in the western U.S., the Sacramento
is the most similar, descending rap-
idly from the Sierra Nevada into
the Sacramento Valley. But the Sac-
ramento Basin is almost three times
the size of the Bioblo Basin, and the
Sacramento River itself 7000 longer.
But even with this much greater
area, the Sacramento's average an-
nual flow is only two-thirds that of
the Bioblo.6
Similarly, compared to Idaho riv-
er basins, the Bioblo produces a very
large amount of water in a relatively
small area. The mean annual flow
at the Bioblo's mouth is about the
same as the Snake River above Lewis-
ton (about 34,000 cfs). 7 But the total
size of the Bioblo basin is just 100/0
of the Snake River Basin upstream of
Lewiston. That portion of the Upper
Snake River Basin above Howell's
Ferry near Minidoka drains 15,700
square miles, still almost 70% larger
than the total Bioblo Basin. Yet the
Snake River's average annual flow
at Howell's Ferry is just 6,500 cfs, or
less than 20% of the Bioblo's annual
average flow.' Put another way, the
Bioblo Basin produces almost ten
times more water per unit area than
the Snake River Basin.
Although the Snake and the
Bioblo seem to share little in com-
mon, the Snake River Basin's reser-
voir storage capacity above Howell's
Ferry is approximately the same as
the Chilean government's ultimate
goal for reservoir storage in the
Bioblo Basin - about 4 million acre
feet - and thus the Snake makes
for an interesting comparison. The
Bioblo's three large dams currently
have a maximum storage capacity of
about 1.2 million acre-feet of water,
the same as a single reservoir in the
Upper Snake: Palisades Reservoir,
the second largest reservoir in that
part of the Snake River basin. Rivers
in the Western United States are far
more developed, and have far greater
reservoir storage capacity, than the
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Biobjo, even if their total flows are
much less. One reason for this is lim-
ited amount of space between the
Andes and the Pacific Ocean - there
simply is not as much room for dams
and reservoirs.
A river without fish?
While the obvious geographic
differences are significant, the more
significant differences, and the ones
that have something to teach us, are
more subtle. One of the differences
between the Biobio and our rivers is
that although the Biobjo is the most
biodiverse of Chilean rivers,9 it lacks
the iconic native fishes found in west-
ern streams. Most of the native fish
are small and largely unknown. The
largest native fish is a homely species
of catfish, reaching about 18 inches
in its largest examples. There are no
native fishes valuable from either a
commercial or cultural perspective.
Although the native Pewenche"
people of the upper Biobjo are con-
sidered a "sociedad riberefia" (a riv-
erine society), they rely on the pine
nuts of the native Pewen1" tree for
both alimentary and spiritual suste-
nance. They have no connection to
rivers or fish similar to that of native
peoples in the Pacific Northwest.
This lack of an iconic, culturally-
important fish species might initially
seem like a benefit to Chilean water
managers, because it would seem to
simplify integrated watershed man-
agement, relative to our experiences
in the Columbia River Basin. But in
many ways the opposite is true. If the
ultimate goal is a river system that
works for all of its inhabitants, pro-
viding cultural, ecological, hydro-
power, flood control, and irrigation
benefits, then salmon and steelhead
provide a useful focal point around
which to engage in conversation and
compromise. Salmon and steelhead
have helped ensure continued politi-
cal power and cultural relevance for
native peoples. They provide reason
for causal participants to care about
river and ecosystem management.
Salmon and steelhead complicate
management, to be sure, but also
provide a reason for that manage-
ment. While we might disagree
about the best route to get there, we
all care about the survival of anad-
romous fish populations. That focal
point is missing in the Bioblo.
Dams without irrigation
The western United States large-
ly avoids another conflict faced in
Chile, but again, not necessarily
because of any wise choices or fore-
sight on our part. Perhaps the most
significant ongoing water use con-
flict in the Biobjo basin involves
disputes between irrigators and hy-
droelectric facilities. 2 In Chile, the
highest power demand occurs dur-
ing the winter, as the shorter day-
light hours require increased use of
electric lighting and heating. In the
Biobjo's Mediterranean climate, the
highest irrigation demand is dur-
ing the summer months, much like
in the western United States. But
unlike the western United States,
most of the Biobfo's water comes in
the form of winter rains. The high-
est river flows are thus in the winter
months, with much lower flows in
the spring and summer months. 3
Given the higher electricity de-
mand in the winter, and the sub-
sequent higher price of electricity
during the winter, hydropower com-
panies release rather than store win-
ter water. During the summer, with
power demand and prices lower,
hydropower companies store rather
than release water. The end result is
that irrigators have water when they
do not need it, and do not have it
when they need it. In contrast, in the
western United States, the period of
greatest power demand is in the late
summer, when air conditioner use is
at its highest. Upstream hydroelec-
tric facilities thus benefit from pass-
ing water downstream during the
same time that water is most needed
by downstream irrigators. As noted
above, Chile does not benefit from
these fortuitously coincident de-
mands.
Who wins when water is scarce?
In Chile, water rights are charac-
terized as consumptive or non-con-
sumptive. Irrigation is a consump-
tive right. Water rights for hydroelec-
tric facilities are non-consumptive,
given that the water theoretically
remains within or returns to the wa-
tercourse.1 4According to Chile's Wa-
During the summer, with power demand and prices lower,
hydropower companies store rather than release water. The end
result is that irrigators have water when they do not need it,
and do not have it when they need it.
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ter Code, non-consumptive rights
can be granted after consumptive
rights, so long as the use of the wa-
ter does not prejudice the rights of
third parties to the same water, ei-
ther in quantity or opportunity to
use (among other things)."5 Because
the largest Bioblo dams are relatively
new,16 this provision should protect
the pre-existing rights of down-
stream irrigators.
But as is often the case, both poli-
tics and economics can influence le-
gal reasoning. In 1993, the Chilean
Supreme Court finally decided a
multi-year long dispute over the rel-
ative priorities of consumptive and
non-consumptive rights. Previously,
in the Maule River Basin, a new dam
(the Pehuenche Hyrdoelectric Plant)
had disrupted the water supply to
downstream, pre-existing consump-
tive rights holders. Notwithstanding
the statutory provision apparently
guaranteeing that non-consumptive
uses could not interfere with con-
sumptive rights, the hydropower
facility claimed that inherent in the
non-consumptive right is the right
to fill an associated reservoir allow-
ing use of the non-consumptive
right, whatever the impact on down-
stream users. The lower courts found
for the downstream users on several
occasions, but the Chilean Supreme
Court repeatedly overturned the
lower courts while avoiding the sub-
stantive issue.17
But with the Pangue Hydro-
electric Facility on the Biobo, the
Chilean Supreme Court finally had
to confront the substantive issue. 8
Pangue was much more controver-
sial than the Pehuenche facility in
the Maule Basin, in part because it
would displace and have significant
effects on native Pewenche commu-
nities. 9 The dam would also have
significant, and arguably not con-
sidered, environmental effects on an
undeveloped river canyon offering
world-class white water rafting. But
opponents seized on the water rights
issue in an effort to stop comple-
tion of the dam. Like the Pehuenche
facility, Pangue would be a run-of-
the-river dam with a small reservoir,
lacking the capacity to store large
quantities of water. It would there-
fore have potentially significant ef-
fects on downstream water users at
sporadic and unpredictable times, as
it altered river flows on a day-to-day
or week-to-week basis to take advan-
tage of favorable market conditions.
Opponents argued that a non-con-
These higher storage capacities
in the United States reflect
systems designed for irrigation
as much as hydropower,
particularly on the Snake River.
sumptive right did not include the
right to alter water flows in this
fashion without concern for the ef-
fects on downstream consumptive
rights holders. The Chilean Supreme
Court, ignoring its previous support
for the property rights of irrigators,
and the apparently clear language of
the statute, determined that the dam
operator could fill its reservoir, and
potentially harm downstream wa-
ter users, without negotiating with
those users in advance. 20
Given this interpretation, it
would seem that it is Chilean law
that is to blame for the conflict. In
a prior appropriation system like
that used in Idaho, the question of
whose rights must be satisfied first
is relatively straight forward - first
in time, first in right. So arguably,
if Chile would adopt a priority sys-
tem more similar to that of western
States, it might avoid this or similar
problems in the future. But it is not
our law that makes the U.S. system
work somewhat better in allocating
water between irrigators and hydro-
electric facilities. Chile's law would
probably work well if Chile were
like the western U.S. in other, non-
legal ways.
Despite recent international con-
troversy about the Biobfo, it remains
a relatively undeveloped basin by
U.S. standards. The main stem of the
Biobifo has only three major dams,
the newest of which has been oper-
ating less than two years. While the
total storage capacity of the system is
apparently unknown, the two largest
dams - Pangue and Ralco - can
only capture about 50% of the Biobfo's
total runoff. In contrast, almost 100%
of the annual runoff can be captured
in the Sacramento River system. And
in the Upper Snake River, the reser-
voirs capture over 80% of historical
average flows. These higher storage
capacities in the United States re-
flect systems designed for irrigation
as much as hydropower, particularly
on the Snake River. The major dams
on the Upper Snake were built by
the Bureau of Reclamation, with the
purpose of constructing "irrigation
works for the storage, diversion, and
development of waters for the recla-
mation of arid and semiarid lands"
in the western United States. 21 In
Chile, the dams are primarily (and
exclusively in some cases) hydropow-
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er facilities. Thus part of the reason
we avoid conflicts between irrigators
and hydroelectric facilities as severe
as those in Chile is that we have al-
ready built a lot of dams, specifically
for irrigation, and thus have already
endured conflict and caused the eco-
logical and cultural harms that Chile
might still be able to - and might
want to - avoid.
While this does not avoid all water use conflicts,
it does provide "more"water to work with, but at significant costs
to riparian ecosystems, migratory fish species, and native cultures
that Chileans are only beginning to experience.
How it is that we avoid conflict
There are thus three reasons, at
least, that might explain why there
is less conflict between irrigators
and hydroelectric facilities in the
western United States than in Chile:
First, we have built far more dams,
have much greater storage capacity,
and capture far more of the annual
runoff than can water managers in
the Bioblo Basin. While this does not
avoid all water use conflicts, it does
provide "more" water to work with,
but at significant costs to riparian
ecosystems, migratory fish species,
and native cultures that Chileans are
only beginning to experience.
Second, due to U.S power use
habits, demand for water for irriga-
tion and hydropower are highest
at the same time: during the sum-
mer. It is primarily this demand for
more power in the summer, rather
than any inherent benefit in how we
manage water, that helps avoid the
conflict seen in Chile. Unlike Chile,
hydroelectric facilities in the west-
ern U.S. can fill their reservoirs when
the water is not needed by irrigators,
and pass water when it is.
Finally, as noted above, the Bioblo
Basin currently provides 19% of the
electricity for Chile's entire Sistema
Interconectado Central.22  In the
U.S., all hydropower from all river
systems only accounts for 50 of our
total power supply. Consequently,
the importance of hydropower in
the Biobjo is much greater, relative
to irrigation. It is also important in
a national, rather than a regional,
sense. Chilean irrigators do not have
the same political power, compared
to private hydroelectric companies,23
and U.S. irrigators.
Idaho's most significant historic
conflict between irrigators and a
hydroelectric facility helps demon-
strate these points. On the surface,
Idaho Power's 1983 lawsuit against
7,500 upstream irrigators threatened
to restrict irrigation on thousands of
acres. 24 While some of the conflict's
effects were significant, 25 the Swan
Falls Agreement ultimately allowed
continued irrigation upstream of
Swan Falls. Again, rather than some
element inherent in our institution-
al regimes, it was the overall system's
physical flexibility, due both to its
natural and constructed elements
(including sufficient available water
at the time),26 as well as the politi-
cal power of the irrigators, that pro-
vided a path toward an agreement
that continues working today. That
flexibility, and even the political con-
ditions benefitting irrigators, might
not exist to help resolve conflicts in
the future.
Conclusion
Compared to Chile, the western
United States avoids certain catego-
ries of significant water resource con-
flicts not necessarily because of any-
thing inherent in our institutions or
governance regimes, but because of
fortuitous ecological and cultural
circumstances, and some previous
significant government-funded or
assisted development that has caused
its own ecological and social prob-
lems. As climate change alters hydro-
logical and socioecological systems,
those same fortuitous aspects of our
overall water regime may no longer
exist. Just as climate and cultural
change might alter Chile's power
demands and the balance of its hy-
dropower production and irrigation
needs, similar changes might unbal-
ance our own currently precariously
balanced hydropower and irriga-
tion needs. More troubling, climate
change might also further threaten
salmon and steelhead populations.
In the Pacific Northwest, these fish
provide a continuing cultural con-
nection to our rivers. As those fish
are threatened, so too is our connec-
tion with and concern for natural
rivers.
Ultimately, Chile's lesson for the
western United States is perhaps
both simple and obvious, but crucial
nonetheless: our water resource in-
stitutions must take into account the
changing cultural, hydrological, eco-
logical, and climatic context of our
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region. In the past, we have avoided
or successfully managed conflict, in
part, because the specific conditions
that existed at that particular time,
potentially independent of the ac-
tual legal structures governing those
conditions. If avoiding conflict was
due to a historical accident as much
as our intentional actions, we must
be aware that those same historical
accidents might not happen again
in the future. The Columbia River
Basin will be a different place - cul-
turally, ecologically, hydrologically,
and climatically - and our water
resource institutions must prepare
for that.
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ed u/cogs/envs-wr/acad em ics/water-
resources/igert-program (last visited
March 3,2015). IGERT Grant #: 1249400.
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ed the Secretary of the Interior in the
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http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.
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22. The SIC is the central power grid,
serving over 90% of Chilean citizens.
23. This is another significant difference
that might warrant its own independent
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River Basin are owned and operated by
the federal government, and thus have
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ibility is the fact that the mean monthly
flows at the Murphy gauge on the Snake
River, in August, apparently have never
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